Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2008

State of Utah v. Kidus Yohannes : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Mark Shurtleff; Utah Attorney General; Counsel for Appellee.
Margaret P. Lindsay; Counsel for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Yohannes, No. 20080377 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2008).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/867

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee
Case No. 200803 77-CA

vs.
KIDUS YOHANNES,
Defendant / Appellant

AMENDED BRIEF OF APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH,
FROM A CONVICTION OF UNLAWFUL ACQUISITION, POSSESSION OR TRANSFER
OF A FINANCIAL TRANSACTION CARD, A THIRD DEGREE FELONY
BEFORE THE HONORABLE GARY D. STOTT

MARK SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Counsel for Appellee
MARGARET P. LINDSAY (6766)
775 West Center Street
P.O. Box 1058
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660
Telephone: (801) 318-3194
Counsel for Appellant
FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

APR 0:200B

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

1

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

1

CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

A.

Nature of the Case

2

B.

Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition

2

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS

3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

9

ARGUMENT
I.

The Evidence was Insufficient to Establish Beyond a Reasonable
Doubt that Yohannes Violated Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-506.3

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
ADDENDA
Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-506.3
Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-506.2

i

9
18

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Statutory Provisions
Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-506.2

9-10

Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-506.3

1-2, 9, 16

Utah Code Annotated § 78A-4-103(2)(e)

1

Cases Cited
Spanish Fork v. Bryan, 1999 UT App 61, 975 P.2d 501
State in the Interest ofM.B., 2008 UT App 433, 198 P.3d 1007
State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1983)

12-15, 17
12-13
13

State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316 (Utah 1985)

13

State v. George, 25 Utah 330, 481 P.2d 667 (1971)

16

State v. Hill, 727 P.2d 221 (Utah 1986)

14, 17

State v. Kennedy, 616 P.2d 594 (Utah 1980)
State v. Layman, 953 P.2d 782 (Utah App. 1998)

17
16

State v. Layman, 1999 UT 79, 985 P.2d 911

12-13

State v. Murphy, 617 P.2d 216 (Utah 1980)

9, 17-18

State v. Nisonger, 2008 UT App 359

16

State v. Salas, 820 P.2d 1386 (Utah App. 1991)

2, 10

State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981 (Utah 1993)

13, 17

ii

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 200.80377-CA
vs.

KIDUS YOHANNES,
Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of
Utah Code Annotated § 78A-4-103(2)(e).

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the evidence was insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that

Yohannes committed the crime of unlawful acquisition, possession or transfer of a
financial transaction card set forth at Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-506.3(1). The standard
of review when challenging the sufficiency of the evidence in a jury trial is: "[T]he
evidence and the reasonable inferences which might be drawn therefrom must be viewed
in the light most favorable to the jury verdict. A juiy conviction is reversed for

insufficient evidence only when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt
that the defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted." State v. Salas, 820
P.2d 1386, 1387 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting State v. Johnson, 114 P.2d 1141, 1147 (Utah
1989)). This issue was preserved in a motion for directed verdict (R. 149: 145-46).

CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
All controlling statutory provisions are attached hereto in the Addenda.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
Kidus Yohannes appeals from the judgment and sentence of the Honorable Gary

D. Stott, Fourth District Court, after he was convicted by a jury of unlawful acquisition,
possession or transfer of a financial transaction card, a third degree felony.

B.

Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition
Kidus Yohannes was charged by criminal information filed in Fourth District

Court on June 19, 2007 with Unlawful Acquisition, Possession or Transfer of a Financial
Transaction Card, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-6506.3 (R. 12). On July 2, 2007 a petition for inquiry into Yohannes' competency was
filed and granted by the trial court (R. 24-). After evaluation, Yohannes was found
2

competent to proceed (R. 36). A preliminary hearing was held before Judge Gary D.
Stott on September 20, 2007 and Yohannes v/as bound over for trial on the charge upon a
finding of probable cause (R. 42-41, 148). Yohannes was subsequently arraigned and
pled "not guilty" (R. 55).
On February 15, 2008 a jury trial was held with Judge Stott presiding (R. 111-09,
149). At the close of the State's case, Yohannes motioned the trial court for a directed
verdict because the evidence was insufficient to establish that Yohannes was in
possession of the debit card with the intent to use it (R. 149: 145-46). The trial court
denied the motion (R. 149: 148-49). After deliberation, the jury convicted Yohannes (R.
109, 135, 149: 182).
On March 27, 2008 Yohannes was sentenced to 36 months probation and 120 days
in the Utah County Jail, with credit for 90 days previously served (R. 145-).
Yohannes filed a notice of appeal in Fourth District Court on April 21, 2008.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
A. Testimony of Officer Randy Crowther
Orem City police detective, Randy Crowther, testified that on June 8, 2007 he
searched a vehicle belonging to Kidus Yohannes pursuant to a search warrant (R. 149:
91-92). The vehicle, a 1992 two-door hatchback Plymouth Laser, had been located by
officers several blocks from Yohannes' residence at 1428 South 630 East in Orem;
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specifically, the vehicle was found in front of a residence at 1910 South 446 East (R. 149:
93, 94, 95). Crowfher testified that the vehicle was locked and the hatchback was closed
(R. 149: 94). They gained access to the vehicle through the sunroof, which was covered
with a cutout piece of a sun visor affixed by tape (R. 149: 94-95).
During the search of the vehicle a debit card from First Interstate Bank in
Wyoming with the name of Sam Westfahl was found sitting in the bottom of the glove
box (R. 149: 96-97). At the time, Westfahl and Yohannes were roommates (R. 149: 96).
Crowther testified that the investigatory basis for the vehicle search had nothing to do
with credit cards; and that he had not been told any credit cards had been missing (R.
149: 98). Crowther also testified that he wore gloves during the search so he wouldn't
contaminate any of the evidence (R. 149: 100).
Crowther did not know how long the vehicle had been there or who had driven it
there (R. 149: 99). Crowther also did not know how long the debit card had been inside
the glove box, or who put it there (R. 149: 101).
Westfahl reported to Crowther that he had reported the debit card missing on June
7, 2007 (R. 149: 102). Westfahl first mentioned the missing card to police on June 8,
2007 during the execution of the search warrant on Westfahl and Yohannes' residence
(R. 149: 102-03). He was informed by Westfahl that the card had not been used (R. 149:
103).
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B. Testimony of Officer Jay Fredrickson
Jay Fredrickson is an Orem City police officer (R. 149: 104). On June 4, 2007 at
about noon, he met with Kidus Yohannes at the police station (R. 149: 105). Yohannes
had brought his computer to the station to report damage or vandalism that had been done
to the computer. Yohannes was upset because that morning he had discovered that the
power cord to the on/off switch on the inside of the computer had been cut (R. 149: 106,
108, 110). Yohannes opened the computer and showed him the cut wires/damage (R.
149: 110-11). A computer repair shop had informed Yohannes that the repair costs
would be about $100 (R. 149: 106).
Yohannes informed Fredrickson that he believed that computer had been damaged
by Sam Westfahl, one of his roommates (R. 149: 106-08). Yohannes told him that he
hadn't had any problems with his roommates, but they were the only ones with overnight
access to his computer (R. 149: 108). Fredrickson attempted to contact Westfahl several
(at least two) times by going to the residence without success (R. 149: 107, 109).
C. Testimony of Sam Westfahl
In June of 2007 Westfahl was living at 1428 South 680 East in Orem, a four
bedroom house (R. 149: 112, 113). The home is owned by Javier Tomai, and his other
roommates were Sam Bird and Kidus Yohannes (R. 149: 113). He shared a bedroom
with Yohannes from May 1-June 8, 2007 (R. 149: 113).
Westfahl testified that his relationship with Yohannes was "strained" (R. 149:
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114). "It just seemed like we never connected, and it seemed like he was just really
standoffish and not approachable" (R. 149: 114). Westfahl testified that he had no
animosity towards Yohannes but thinks that "he probably had toward me" (R. 149: 114).
Westfahl also testified that when he first met Yohannes, he believed that Yohannes did
not act "normal" and that his behavior was "odd" (R. 149: 126).
Westfahl verified ownership of the debit card introduced into evidence (R. 149:
115). June 8, 2007 was a Friday (R. 149: 114). Westfahl testified to using the debit card
"the previous weekend, and then Monday, Tuesday [June 4th and 5th] just noticed it
wasn't there and [he] thought [he] had just lost it or misplaced it" in his room or in some
clothing (R. 149: 115-16, 128). On June 7, 2007 Westfahl reported it missing to his bank
(R. 149: 129). Later that evening he called the police from a Maverick store, and
subsequently met with an officer about things that Yohannes] was doing that he felt were
suspicious (R. 149: 130). At this time, however, Westfahl did not report to the police that
his debit card was missing (R. 149: 130). He didn't mention the missing card to police
until the next day when they came and searched Yohannes' portion of the bedroom and
his car (R. 149: 130). He also did not contact the police to inform them that he had not
damaged the computer (R. 149: 135). He testified that he "wasn't worried about it....
[And] figured if they wanted to contact [him] they would have found [him]" (R. 149:
135).
Westfahl normally kept the card on his person or in his top dresser drawer or
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surrounding area (R. 149: 116). Westfahl used half the drawers in the bedroom and
Yohannes used the other half (R. 149: 116). Westfahl had his clothes in the closet while
Yohannes kept his in bags by his bed (R. 149: 116).
Westfahl testified that Yohannes kept his computer upstairs in the living room,
which was a common area in the house (R. 149: 118). Westfahl never used the computer
(R. 149: 118). He testified that Yohannes was always on the computer—five to ten hours
a day (R. 149: 119). Westfahl believed his internet activity was "suspicious" and raised
"some red flags" (R. 149: 127). Specifically, Westfahl had concerns about the "type of
websites he was looking at online, and then some of the clothes he would wear... from
time to time" (R. 149: 127).
On Monday night (June 4th) he was notified by Javier Tomai that Yohannes has
accused him of vandalizing the computer (R. 149: 120, 134). Westfahl denied damaging
the computer (R. 149: 120). On Tuesday morning (June 5th), Westfahl testified that
Yohannes came upstairs, visibly upset, and accused him of taking the key to his car (R.
149: 121). Yohannes was "enraged." He was "yelling, he was stomping, he was flailing
hi arms. You know, it's just obviously very upset" (R. 149: 121). Westfahl and Tomai
located the key in an open bag belonging to Yohannes on June 6th or 7th (R. 149: 122).
That week Yohannes gave Westfahl the "silent treatment" and would glare at him with
anger in his face (R. 149: 123). Tomai informed him that he had called a locksmith while
the key was missing (R. 149: 132).
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Westfahl testified he never gave Yohannes or anyone else permission to possess
his debit card (R. 149: 1?4). Usually Yohannes parked his vehicle on the street or in the
driveway (R. 149: 124). Westfahl denied ever riding in the vehicle of having access to it
(R. 149: 125).
The debit card was never used (R. 149: 136).
D. Testimony of Kelvin Jasperson
Kelvin Jasperson is employed at PC Club, a store that sells computer components
and repairs computers (R. 149: 151). On June 4, 2007 he looked at a computer Yohannes
had previously purchased from the shop (R. 149: 152). Yohannes informed him that a
roommate or friend had damaged it and he wanted it repaired (R. 149: 152). He
examined the computer and discovered that inside the unit some cables/wires had been
cut (R. 149: 153). The cut was "clean" and were not the product of normal wear and tear
(R. 149: 154). Jasperson had estimated the costs of the repairs to be $100 (R. 149: 15455).
E. Stipulation
The jury was given the following written stipulation: "The Utah State Crime Lab
performed a finger-print analysis of the debit card in question. One fingerprint was
located. It has been determined that it does not belong to the defendant. It is unknown
whose print was found on the card" (Exhibit #3).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
For Yohannes to be convicted of violating Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-506.3, the
State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he: One, acquired a financial
transaction card from another without the consent of the card holder; and two, that he did
so with the intent to use it. However, in cases of circumstantial evidence, "[CJriminal
convictions may not be based upon conjectures or probabilities and before [this Court]
can uphold a conviction it must be supported by a quantum of evidence concerning each
element of the crime as charged from which the jury may base its conclusion of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Murphy, 617 P.2d 399, 404 (Utah 1980). Yohannes
asserts that the circumstantial evidence introduced at trial was insufficient to establish
either element of the crime for which he was convicted beyond a reasonable doubt.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH BEYOND A
REASONABLE DOUBT THAT VIOLATED UTAH CODE ANNOTATE § 76-6-506.3
Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-506.3(1) makes it a third degree felony to acquire "a
financial transaction card from another without the consent of the card holder or the
issuer, or with the knowledge that it has been acquired without consent, and with intent to
use it in violation of Section 76-6-506.2." In relation to Utah Code Annotated § 76-6506.2, the jury was instructed that this section makes it unlawful for any person to
9

"knowingly, with intent to defraud, obtain or attempt to obtain credit or purchase or
attempt to purchase goods, property, or services, by use of a stolen or fraudulently
obtained financial transaction card" (R. 130 - Jury Instruction # 16C). See Utah Code
Annotated § 76-6-506.2(1). In other words to be convicted the State had to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that Yohannes: One, acquired a financial transaction card from
another without the consent of the card holder; and two, that he did so with the intent to
use it. Yohannes asserts that the evidence introduced at trial was insufficient to establish
beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the crime.
On appeal, this Court must view the evidence and its reasonable inferences in the
light most favorable to the jury verdict; and this court may reverse Yohannes5 conviction
for "insufficient evidence only when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently mconclusive
or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt
that [he] committed the crime of which he was convicted." State v. Salas, 820 P.2d 1386,
1387 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting State v. Johnson, 11r4 P.2d 1141, 1147 (Utah 1989)).
The first element that State had to establish beyond a reasonable doubt was that
Yohannes acquired a financial transaction card belonging to Sam Westfahl without his
consent. The evidence introduced at trial in regards to this element consisted of the
following:
Westfahl and Yohannes were roommates who shared a bedroom and whose
relationship was at best "strained" (R. 149: 113, 114). Westfahl normally kept his debit
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card on his person or in his top dresser drawer or surrounding area (R. 149: 116). On
June 4th or 5th, Westfahl could not fmd the card and believed it to be lost or misplaced
(R. 149: 115-16, 128). Westfahl did not give Yohannes or anyone else permission to
possess his debit card (R. 149: 124).
On June 4th, Yohannes filed a report of vandalism with the police relating to
intentional damage to his computer that he believed was caused by Westfahl (R. 149:
106-08, 110-11). Yohannes told the officer that he had not had any difficulties or
problems with his roommates, but they were the only ones with overnight access to his
computer (R. 149: 108). He told the technician at the repair shop that a roommate or
friend must have caused the damage (R. 149: 152). That night, Westfahl was informed
by another roommate that Yohannes had accused him of vandalizing the computer (R.
149: 120, 134).
On June 7th, Westfahl reported to his bank that the card was missing (R. 149: 129).
Later that night, he called the police and subsequently met with an officer about
suspicious behavior by Yohannes, however, he did not mention anything to the officer
about the missing debit card (R. 149: 130). Westfahl found Yohannes' internet activity—
the type of websites he was looking at—and some of the clothes he would wear to be
suspicious (R. 149: 127).
On June 8th, based upon Westfahl's report, police executed a search warrant on
Yohannes' portion of the bedroom and his vehicle, which was parked several blocks from
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the residence (R. 149: 91-92, 93-95). While the warrant was being executed, Westfahl
mentioned to police that his debit card was missing (R. 149: 130).
The police accessed the inside of the vehicle through the sunroof, which had a
sunvisor taped to it to fill the hole (R. 149: 94-95). The debit card was found sitting in
the bottom of the glove box in Yohannes' locked vehicle (R. 149: 94, 96-97). Yohannes
was not present. His fingerprints were not found on the card, which was tested by the
Utah State Crime Lab (Exhibit #3). The officer testified he did not know how long the
vehicle had been located there, or who had driven it there (R. 149: 99). He also testified
that he did not know how long the debit card had been inside the glove box, or who put it
there (R. 149: 101). Westfahl denied ever riding in the vehicle or having access to it (R.
149: 125).
The debit card was never used (R. 149: 136).
Because Yohannes was not present at the time the debit card was discovered in his
vehicle, the State had to prove constructive possession (R. 149: 146-47). See Spanish
Fork v. Bryan, 1999 UT App 61, % 7, 975 P.2d 501. Constructive possession "occurs
when 'there [i]s a sufficient nexus between the defendant and the [item] to permit a
factual inference that the defendant had the power and the intent to exercise control over
the [item]." State in the Interest ofM.B., 2008 UT App 433, ^ 21, 198 P.3d 1007
(quoting State v. Layman, 1999 UT 79, f 15, 985 P.2d 911). "Stated differently, to show
constructive possession, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the [item]
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w[as] subject to the defendant's dominion and control and the defendant had the intent to
exercise that control." Id. (quoting Layman, 1999 UT 79 at \ 16). "Knowledge and the
ability to possess do not equal possession where there is no evidence of intent to make
use of that knowledge and ability." State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 319 (Utah 1985).
Moreover, "[w]hether a sufficient nexus between the accused and the [item] exists
depends on the facts and circumstances of each case." Id See also, M.B., 2008 UT App
433 at H 21; and Layman, 1999 UT 79 at If 14.
In addition, the State has acknowledged that the evidence against Yohannes is
circumstantial (R. 149: 147-48). "Although circumstantial evidence may be enough to
prove constructive possession, the State has the burden of establishing beyond a
reasonable doubt that [Yohannes] committed each element of the crime charged." Bryan,
1999 UT App 61 at 1f 10 (citing State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 985 (Utah 1993)).
Furthermore, "that burden requires a presentation of extensive and detailed facts." Id
See also, State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258, 1264 (Utah 1983).
Yohannes asserts that the State failed to meet its burden of establishing beyond a
reasonable doubt that he constructively possessed or acquired Westfahl5s debit card.
Westfahl5s debit card, which had been missing a few days, was found in Yohannes'
vehicle. Yohannes and Westfahl did not get along. Yohannes had reported to police that
he believed that Westfahl had intentionally damaged his computer. At approximately, the
same time, Westfahl testified that his debit card disappeared or was misplaced. A few
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days after Yohannes' report to police, Westfahl reported to police that he believed
Yohannes was engaging in suspicious behavior. This resulted in the execution of a
search warrant on Yohannes5 portion of the bedroom and on his vehicle. Yohannes'
vehicle was found by police to be locked but accessible through the glassless sunroof.
Yohannes' fingerprints were not found on the debit card. Westfahl testified that he had
never ridden in the car or had access to it. Westfahl did not report the missing debit card
to police during his initial report concerning Yohannes' behavior. He did not mention it
until the following day when officers arrived to execute a search warrant.
There was no evidence introduced that Yohannes made any incriminating
statements about the debit card. See Bryan, 1999 UT App 61 at ^f 9 (A factor weighing
against conviction in a constructive possession case based on circumstantial evidence was
that "defendant made no statements, incriminating or otherwise"). There was no evidence
introduced that Yohannes and Westfahl were the only people with access to the bedroom,
where Westfahl usually kept his debit card when it was not on his person. In fact, two
other individuals resided at the residence. In addition, Westfahl did not testify as to the
last known location of the debit card, only that he had used it over the weekend and that it
was missing on Monday or Tuesday. Westfahl did not testify that Yohannes was aware
that he had a debit card, or aware of where it was stored/placed when not on his person.
Westfahl also did not testify to having other items taken from his possession or to any
suspicious behavior by Yohannes in relation to theft. In addition, there was no evidence
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that although the vehicle belonged to Yohannes, that he was the only person with access
to it or access to the glove box. Even though the vehicle was locked when it was
searched by police, they did not have a difficult time gaining access to the inside of the
vehicle through the sunroof, which had the glass missing.
Yohannes asserts that "the necessary nexus between [him] and the items seized
does not exist... [and] that neither possibilities nor probabilities can substitute for
certainty beyond a reasonable doubt." Bryan, 1999 UT App 61 at ^ 10. The fact that the
debit card was found in Yohannes' vehicle a few days after he had accused Westfahl of
vandalism is insufficient for the State to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he
constructively possessed/acquired the debit card. Instead this evidence presents only the
possibility or perhaps even the probability that there was a nexus between Yohannes and
the debit card. In truth, the evidence is nothing more than conjecture.
Westfahl had an equal mistrust and motive to retaliate against Yohannes for
accusing him of vandalizing the computer. It is certainly curious that Westfahl failed to
report the missing debit card to police when he initially detailed Yohannes' suspicious
behavior, but instead waited until the warrant was being executed. Moreover, while any
number of persons could have vandalized the computer, a similar number of persons
could have picked up the debit card and put it in Yohannes' vehicle. Yohannes' vehicle
may have been found locked and away from the residence at the time the warrant was
executed on June 8th. However, the police had no trouble accessing the inside of the
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vehicle, and there was no evidence that Yohannes was the only one who drove or rode in
the vehicle or even where the vehicle was located in the previous three to four days.
Accord State v. George, 25 Utah 330, 481 P.2d 667 (1971) (Conviction for larceny
reversed when there were other hypotheses inconsistent with larceny that could be
constructed out of the tenuous facts which existed).
To convict Yohannes under Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-506.3, the State also had
to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he acquired or possessed the debit card "with
intent to use it.55 Yohannes asserts that intent is a separate element of this offense. Cf
State v. Nisonger, 2008 UT App 359 (Intent to use the weapon is not part of the
possession offense of possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person where
"dangerous weapon" is defined as "any item capable of causing death or serious bodily
injury"). Ordinarily intent may be established or inferred from acts, conduct or
circumstances. See e.g. State v. Kennedy, 616 P.2d 594, 598 (Utah 1980) (When intent is
an element of the crime, its proof must rely on inference from surrounding
circumstances).
The State argued that Yohannes had a motive or intent to use the card because he
had alleged that Westfahl had vandalized his computer and it was going to cost him $100
to repair (R. 149: 148). However, this proposition is really nothing more than conjecture,
or a mere possibility. "[N]either possibilities nor probabilities can substitute for certainty
beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Layman, 953 P.2d 782, 792 (Utah App. 1998).
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Accord State v. Murphy, 617 P.2d 399, 402 (Utah 1980).
There was no evidence introduced that Yohannes attempted to pay for repairs with
a debit card. He made no incriminating statements as to taking the card or intending to
use it—or any statements about seeking retaliation against Westfahl. His fingerprints
were not found on the card, and the debit card was not used while it was missing, nor was
there evidence that any attempts at using the card were made. In relation to the damage
done to his computer, Yohannes reported the incident to police. There was no evidence
that he confronted Westfahl about the situation or that he demanded payment from
Westfahl for the alleged damage. In addition, based on the State's reasoning, Westfahl
had an equal motive for retaliating against Yohannes for reporting him to the police as to
the damage done to the computer.
Yohannes asserts that the evidence introduced at trial was insufficient for the State
to meet its burden of establishing a quantum of evidence concerning the intent element
from which the jury could have based its conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Murphy, 617 P.2d at 404. Particularly when in constructive possession cases like this, the
State's burden "requires a presentation of extensive and detailed facts." Bryan, 1999 UT
App 61 at 1f 10. The only evidence produced by the State in relation to this element was
conjecture or possibility, and therefore, it was insufficient to establish proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. See Workman, 852 P.2d at 985 ("When, as here, the evidence consists
solely of undisputed, circumstantial evidence, the role of the reviewing court is to
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determine (1) whether there is any evidence that supports each and every element of the
crime charged, and (2) whether the inferences that can be drawn from that evidence have
a basis in logic and reasonable human experience sufficient to prove each legal element
of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. A guilty verdict is not legally valid if it is
based solely on inferences that give rise to only remote or speculative possibilities of
guilt").
This case is a constructive possession case based solely on circumstantial
evidence. In such cases, "[C]riminal convictions may not be based upon conjectures or
probabilities and before [this Court] can uphold a conviction it must be supported by a
quantum of evidence concerning each element of the crime as charged from which the
jury may base its conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Murphy, 617
P.2d 399, 404 (Utah 1980). Yohannes asserts that the circumstantial evidence introduced
at trial was insufficient to establish either element of the crime for which he was
convicted beyond a reasonable doubt.
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
Yohannes asks that this Court reverse his conviction because the evidence was
insufficient to establish that he committed the crime of unlawful acquisition, possession
or transfer of a financial transaction card.
DATED t h i s ^ a y of April, 2009.

MARGARET P. LINDS
Counsel for Appellant
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West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 76. Utah Criminal Code
*H Chapter 6. Offenses Against Property
*!§Part5. Fraud
-* § 76-6-506.2. Financial transaction card offenses—Unlawful use of card or automated banking device—False application for card
It is unlawful for any person to:
(1) knowingly, with intent to defraud, obtain or attempt to obtain credit or purchase or attempt to purchase goods,
property, or services, by the use of a false, fictitious, altered, counterfeit, revoked, expired, stolen, or fraudulently
obtained financial transaction card, by any financial transaction card credit number, personal identification code, or
by the use of a financial transaction card not authorized by the issuer or the card holder;
(2) use a financial transaction card, with intent to defraud, to knowingly and willfully exceed the actual balance of a
demand or time deposit account;
(3) use a financial transaction card, with intent to defraud, to willfully exceed an authorized credit line by $500 or
more, or by 50% of such line, whichever is greater;
(4) willfully, with intent to defraud, deposit into his or any other account by means of an automated banking device
a false, fictitious, forged, altered, or counterfeit check, draft, money order, or any other similar document;
(5) make application for a financial transaction card to an issuer, while knowingly making or causing to be made a
false statement or report relative to his name, occupation, financial condition, assets, or to willfully and substantially
undervalue or understate any indebtedness for the purposes of influencing the issuer to issue the financial transaction
card; or
(6) knowingly, with intent to defraud any authorized credit card merchant, card holder, or issuer, sell or attempt to
sell credit card sales drafts to an authorized credit card merchant or any other person or organization, for any consideration whether at a discount or otherwise, or present or cause to be presented to the issuer or an authorized credit
card merchant, for payment or collection, any such credit card sales draft, if:
(a) the draft is counterfeit or fictitious;
(b) the purported sales evidenced by any such credit card sales draft did not take place;
(c) the purported sale was not authorized by the card holder;
(d) the items or services purported to be sold as evidenced by the credit card sales drafts are not delivered or rendered to the card holder or person intended to receive them; or
(e) when delivered or rendered, the goods or services are materially different or of materially lesser value or qual-
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ity than represented by the seller or his agent to the purchaser, or have substantial discrepancies from goods or
services impliedly represented by the purchase price when compared with the actual goods or services delivered
or rendered
CREDIT(S)
Laws 1983, c 96. § 3, Laws 199L c 60, § 4. Laws 2007. c 306. § 100. eff April 30. 2007
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
Laws 2007, c 306, redesignated former subsecs (6)(i) through (v) as subsecs (6)(a) through (e)
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f>
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 76. Utah Criminal Code
*li Chapter 6. Offenses Against Property
*1 Part 5. Fraud
-f § 76-6-506.3. Financial transaction card offenses—Unlawful acquisition, possession, or transfer of
card
Any person is guilty of a third degree felony who:
(1) acquires a financial transaction card from another without the consent of the card holder or the issuer, or, with
the knowledge that it has been acquired without consent, and with intent to use it in violation of Section 76-6-506.2;
(2) receives a financial transaction card with intent to use it in violation of Section 76-6-506.2;
(3) sells or transfers a financial transaction card to another person with the knowledge that it will be used in violation of Section 76-6-506.2;
(4)(a) acquires a financial transaction card that the person knows was lost, mislaid, or delivered under a mistake as
to the identity or address of the card holder; and
(b)(i) retains possession with intent to use it in violation of Section 76-6-506.2; or
(ii) sells or transfers a financial transaction card to another person with the knowledge that it will be used in violation of Section 76-6-506.2; or
(5) possesses, sells, or transfers any information necessary for the use of a financial transaction card, including the
credit number of the card, the expiration date of the card, or the personal identification code related to the card:
(a)(i) without the consent of the card holder or the issuer; or
(ii) with the knowledge that the information has been acquired without consent of the card holder or the issuer;
and
(b) with intent to use the information in violation of Section 76-6-506.2.
CREDIT(S)
Laws 1983, c. 96, § 4; Laws 1997. c. 191. $ 2. eff. May 5. 1997; Laws 2003, c. 306. § L eff. Mav 5. 2003.
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
Laws 2003, c. 306, added subsec. (5).
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